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Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National
Comparison
DIDIER RUEDIN
This paper compares the levels of ethnic group representation in parliament in 95 democ-
racies. The analyses are comparative in nature, breaking with the literature where single
country studies are the norm. Considering both electoral and cultural variables, the results
cast doubt on whether the role of the electoral system in shaping political representation is
dominant. In contrast to what much of the literature suggests, once controlling for the
ethnic make-up of society and cultural attitudes, electoral aspects seem of little signifi-
cance. Levels of ethnic group representation are best explained with cultural variables,
in particular liberal attitudes towards marginalised groups in society.
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Introduction
The representation of citizens in their parliament is at the core of liberal democ-
racy. The argument is that all citizens are of equal status and worth, and conse-
quently all groups of society have the same right to a presence in parliament.
Despite advances in the last century, ideas of equality and inclusiveness are far
from accomplished. In some places ethnic minority groups remain systematically
marginalised. This article examines how differences in the levels of ethnic group
representation can be explained. Whilst there are many contributions to political
representation focusing on the representation of women, there is surprisingly
little on ethnic minority groups.
In this article, the influence of electoral and cultural factors on ethnic group
representation is examined. The focus is on the macro level, and the analyses are
comparative in order to tease out significant patterns. The existence of a clear link
between the representation of ethnic groups and the representation of views par-
ticular to minority groups is contested, but having ethnic minorities present in
parliament is usually sought in the name of justice and legitimacy (Milne
1981, Van Cott 2005). What is more, higher levels of ethnic group representation
are also linked to better integration: where levels of representation are higher,
fewer members of ethnic minorities feel alienated by the political system
(Pantoja and Segura 2003). Whether true or not, many members of ethnic min-
orities seem to think that their interests can only be appropriately represented
by another group member (Ross 1943, Schwartz 1988, Phillips 1993, Williams
1995). Reynolds (2006) follows a similar line of thought, arguing that only
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where minority communities are properly included can ethnic conflict be
avoided. Minorities in many places are systematically excluded from significant
decisions, such as electoral reform, government, or the drafting of a new consti-
tution. It is argued that where certain ethnic groups are excluded, such as the
Roma in many European countries, the potential for future conflict remains
(Horowitz 1985, Ramet 1997).
In the literature on ethnic group representation single-country studies are the
norm (Messina 1989, Anwar 1994, Ramet 1997, Geissner 1997, Johnson 1998,
Saggar 2000, Pantoja and Segura 2003). Bird (2005) goes further by comparing
three developed countries, but she steers clear of a numerical analysis. Reynolds
(2006) provides a cross-national perspective, but only addresses individual ethnic
groups whilst focusing on the electoral system. In single-nation studies, the focus
is often on a specific ethnic minority group, or the ethnic minority population
lumped together as opposed to the majority population. Reynolds suggests the
electoral system as a factor that can foster cooperation between members of
different ethnic groups at the national level: working towards a stable and
peaceful democracy. The electoral system and its key institutions are also men-
tioned in other studies (Horowitz 1985, Welch 1990, Saggar 2000, Spirova 2004,
Bochsler 2006).
Many single-country studies focus on representation at the local level
(Engstrom and McDonald 1982, Welch 1990, Saggar and Geddes 2000,
Garbaye 2000, Bousetta 2001, Togeby 2005). Highlighting the complex interplay
of class and ethnicity, Saggar (2000) warns of attributing all difference to ethni-
city. In Britain, it is argued, higher levels of representation at the local level do
not lead to reduced alienation from the system overall. Also with a focus on
Britain, Anwar (1994) highlights the geographical concentration of ethnic
groups in many cases. This means that within certain districts, the importance
of ethnic minorities as voters is increased; they may even form the majority
locally. In such cases, political parties often actively woo votes from ethnic min-
orities. Nonetheless, at the national level ethnic minorities remain grossly under-
represented in parliament (Anwar 1994, Bogaards 2004, Togeby 2005).
Political parties also feature in Bird’s (2005) account of visible minorities in
France, Denmark, and Canada. The argument is that historically minority groups
tend to be under-represented in almost all countries, which includes ethnic min-
orities. Bird outlines how parties utilise ethnic minority candidates in areas where
this is strategically successful, where parties actively promote an alternative to
the ‘traditional’ white candidate. Messina (1989), focusing on the British case,
argues that racial difference is still largely absent in the mainstream political dis-
course, despite increasing demands for inclusion. This is echoed by Saggar and
Geddes (2000).
Socio-economic constraints are another factor sometimes cited (Geissner
1997, Chaney and Fevre 2002), whereas cultural factors are often implied, such
as when historical under-representation and discrimination – intentional or
not – are touched upon (Geissner 1997, Saggar and Geddes 2000, Bird 2005).
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Johnson (1998), for instance, examines the role of black Brazilians in their
national parliament. Most studies ignore ethnic divisions, since society is not per-
ceived as primarily divided along this line. In Brazil, the initial concentration of
black candidates in radical left parties meant another hurdle towards represen-
tation. What is more, attitudes that regard non-Whites as less suited for public
office seem still commonplace (Johnson 1998). Such discrimination may inhibit
ethnic representation (Yashar 1997, Johnson 1998, Saggar and Geddes 2000).
Empirically, the effects of cultural attitudes on levels of ethnic representation
have not been tested before. In much of the literature the role of attitudes is
touched upon, sometimes implicitly. Like Saggar (2000), Banda and Chinkin
(2004) highlight the complexity of the issue, with different minority statuses
often interlocking. A member of an ethnic minority may at the same time also
be disadvantaged because of his or her particular class or gender, for instance.
Discrimination on the basis of racial differences is a familiar theme in the litera-
ture (Geissner 1997, Darity and Mason 1998, Murji 2002). However, such forms
of discrimination are not always visible (Murji 2002), and not normally part of
the mainstream discourse (Saggar and Geddes 2000).
What unites all studies on ethnic group representation is their finding that
members of ethnic minorities are significantly under-represented in positions
of power, but Alba and Moore (1982) note that the popular view of complete
exclusion of ethnic minorities is sometimes exaggerated. Geissner (1997) high-
lights that, despite much talk of an ethnification of the world, the integration of
ethnic minority groups is incomplete: rhetoric and reality do not seem to
match. In France this is reflected in the low level of Algerians and Muslims in
local councils (Geissner 1997). As in most studies on ethnic representation, the
representation of ethnic minority groups in the national parliament does not
feature highly in this particular study, perhaps because this seems blatantly out
of reach. Saggar (2000) equally focuses on representation at the local level, poss-
ibly a more realistic short-term goal. Assuming geographical concentration, local
representation also stands for a certain degree of local autonomy (Saggar 2000).
Whilst local representation is important (Welch 1990, Saggar and Geddes 2000,
Garbaye 2000, Bousetta 2001), it might be argued that inclusion in the national
parliament is a better reflection of the status of ethnic groups in society overall.
Hypotheses
In terms of electoral factors, large influences can be expected to be related to the
proportionality of the electoral system, the efficiency of the system, as well as the
presence of quotas or reserved seats. The proportionality between votes cast and
seats gained is a key feature of electoral systems, a factor highlighted amongst
others by Reynolds (2006). Assuming that most voters cast a sincere vote expres-
sing their preferences, the disproportionality of electoral systems may lead to
misrepresentation in parliament. Therefore it can be expected that more pro-
portional systems lead to higher levels of ethnic group representation (H1).
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Linked to factors of the electoral system is the experience of working within
certain parameters. All the involved actors, from voters to the e´lite, need some
time to understand the effects of the electoral system and its key institutions
(Fuchs and Klingemann 1990, Crigler 1996, Herrera 1999). What follows is
that political communication – and with that the efficiency of the system – is
improved in more established democracies. Levels of ethnic group representation
can thus be expected to be higher in more established democracies (H2).
Quotas and similar measures that are sometimes introduced to address the
representation of minority groups are an electoral factor that is not about the pro-
portionality of the system. In practice, reserved seats are the preferred method for
ethnic groups (Htun 2004). Whilst leaving the overall electoral system and key
institutions unaffected, quotas and related measures work in parallel, with the
sole intention to increase the level of representation of certain minority groups.
Given their specific aim, it can be expected that the presence of quotas or reserved
seats is associated with higher levels of ethnic group representation (H3).
Cultural aspects, in contrast, can be thought to influence both the supply and
demand of candidates from ethnic minority groups. In terms of the supply of can-
didates, members of ethnic minorities are more likely to come forward as candi-
dates where the environment is more supportive of their inclusion. Looking at the
demand, a population more positive towards minority groups is more likely to
support these for inclusion in positions of power, both within parties and at the
polls. Of interest are liberal attitudes towards minority groups and marginalised
groups of society in general. Several factors are thought to shape such cultural
attitudes: religion, the level of development, as well as regional differences.
The level of development may work on the basis of deindustrialisation and
with that the rise in post-material values (Inglehart 1997). This shift is thought
to increase concerns for the rights of minority groups (Schmitt 1990, Norris
and Lovenduski 1995). Regional differences, in contrast, work on the basis of
historical differences: access to trade routes, involvement in seafaring, or the
experience of colonialism is thought to influence value patterns. The intuition
here is that regular contact with other cultures and particular work settings
fostered a certain degree of open-mindedness, reflected in present-day cultural
attitudes (Bystydzienski 1995, Rabb and Suleiman 2003). As a result it can be
expected that in countries where attitudes towards marginalised groups in
society are more positive, the level of ethnic group representation is higher (H4).
Data and Methodology
Methods
In order to test these hypotheses, a cross-national perspective is employed, cover-
ing single or lower chambers of parliament in 95 countries. Unfortunately it was
impossible to obtain data on all countries, but this article includes nearly three-
quarters of the countries with free elections. The analyses in this article only
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cover countries with free elections because the argument is rooted in concerns of
justice. This means that countries where the competitiveness of elections is
doubtful are excluded from consideration. Acknowledging that the concept of
free elections is somewhat indefinite (Diamond 2002), this article is restricted
to countries classified as free or partially free by Freedom House (2006). The
military coup in Thailand took place in 2006 after the data were compiled, and
Thailand is thus included in the data. The robustness of the reported results is
tested to model specification and sample selection, as well as multicollinearity.
Variables
As one of an ethnic group the author understands a group of people with an
awareness of a shared culture and ancestorship, and who are thus related
through kinship. Ethnicity therefore refers to self-declared group membership
(Jenkins 1997). Despite elements of choice – ethnicity being what one identifies
with – ethnic identities are rather stable (Green 2005). This means that a sys-
tematic analysis of ethnic groups is possible. The self-declared ethnicity of citi-
zens is readily recorded in surveys, and also the relevant concept when it comes to
political representation: a person is more likely to feel represented by a parlia-
mentarian if they both identify with the same ethnicity, rather than where an
external authority declares one to represent the other. Depending on the
country, ethnic differences can refer to different cleavages – be it culture,
language, religion, or a combination of these. In each country the most salient
ethnic divisions are used to calculate the representation scores. This means that
in different countries different groups are used, and that the membership to
any ethnic group is only fixed within a country. For example, the fact that the
understanding of what constitutes Asian or Black differs between countries is
therefore no longer an issue. In some instances I have also tried classifying
ethnic divisions in different ways, but the overall results are never significantly
affected.
The level of ethnic group representation is understood as the difference
between the proportions of citizens and parliamentarians falling into certain
ethnic groups. The fundamental premise is the same as in the approach used
by Reynolds (2006), but the measure used here enables us to incorporate multiple
ethnic groups at the same time. The ethnic representation score (ERS) is calcu-
lated as the difference between the proportion of each ethnic group in the popu-
lation (PZ;i) and the same in the elected members of parliament (PR;i). The







. The variable i is categorical, and
the subtraction from 1 is necessary to ensure that higher levels of representation
are marked by higher values. The division by 2 is used to standardise values
between 0 and 1, making the measure correspond to the Rose Index (Mackie
and Rose 1991).
In different countries different categories are used, allowing this measure
to cater for the most salient ethnic differences, rather than imposing external
categories. The ethnic representation score is equally suited for countries
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where there are minority groups, or where the population is divided into groups of
similar size. The representation scores calculated theoretically range from 0 to
1. A value of 1 denotes a perfect match between citizens and the representatives.
It is achieved where the proportions of the ethnic minority and majority groups in
the population are perfectly reflected in parliament. The other end of the scale
stands for perfect discrepancy.
The measure used deliberately does not account for the make-up of society.
Rooted in arguments of justice, ethnic minorities should have a right to be
included no matter what their size. Particularly Young’s (1990) argument empha-
sises the need to include all groups. Bearing in mind that – apart from San
Marino – every country includes ethnic minorities, values of the ethnic represen-
tation score remain meaningful. Looking at the proportion of ethnic minorities in
parliament relative to their numbers in the population leads essentially to the
same results as reported here. In a few cases a single group is over-represented
relative to their size in the population – such as the Hungarians in Slovenia or
the Chinese in Trinidad and Tobago (see also Reynolds 2006) – but most
ethnic minority groups are under-represented relative to their share of the popu-
lation. The proportional measure, however, is not suited to a cross-national com-
parison, since in each country only a single ethnic group can be considered in a
meaningful manner.
For the data considered in this article, the measure of ethnic representation
scores and the Gallagher Index of least squares (Gallagher 1991, 1992) lead to
almost identical results (r ¼ 0.96). Differences occur because the Gallagher
Index is sensitive to splitting groups: the more groups that are considered, the
smaller the resulting value relative to the measure used in this article. For
example, if there are 80 per cent blue and 20 per cent orange in a population,
but all the representatives in parliament are blue, both formulas lead to the
same result (0.8). However, if we then differentiate between 10 per cent dark
orange and 10 per cent light orange, the two measures lead to different values.
The Gallagher Index will result in a value of 0.83, whilst the measure used in
this article is unaffected (0.8). In the case of ethnic group representation, only
the latter is satisfactory, but in practice the differences are insignificantly small.
As for the independent variables, the electoral formula is used to capture the
effects of the electoral system in its wider sense. Reynolds (2006) in particular
highlighted the role of the electoral formula. Electoral formulas were classified
following Colomer (2004), with mixed systems classified as either PR or major-
itarian depending on their tendency, following Shugart and Wattenberg (2003).
Differentiating electoral formulas in more detail does not affect the substantive
results reported. Similarly, considering the actual vote–seat proportionality
instead of the electoral formula does not affect the reported findings. Because
of collinearity issues, other factors such as the district magnitude or the
number of parties are not included in the analysis presented, being closely
related to the electoral formula. No significant differences could be found in
models including such variables: electoral thresholds, the number of parties,
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the presence of preferential voting, district magnitude, or vote–seat proportion-
ality. What is more, the availability of reliable data clearly favours the use of the
electoral formula, to which these other factors are closely related.
A further electoral factor is the consideration of how well a democracy is
established. Both the age since democratic rule was established and the level
of political rights can be considered (Freedom House 2006). The year in which
democracy was established was taken from Colomer (2004). Where there are
multiple such occurrences, the latest date of establishing the democracy is
taken, such as after a spell of dictatorship. Following Colomer (2004) and
Farrell (2001), countries where democracy was established in the 20 years
before 2006 are considered new democracies. Using the age of democracy as a
continuous variable, the reported effects are weakened but substantively unaf-
fected. The Freedom House measure of political rights – a seven-point scale –
is used as a control variable, although its exclusion does not affect the results
significantly.
A final electoral factor is the presence of quotas for ethnic groups. Data were
taken from Htun (2004) and IDEA (2006); and cross-checked against a number of
other sources. Quotas were also coded into different variables whether they are
reserved seats or some other form of quotas. The exact nature of such measures
does not seem to affect the reported findings, where a simple binary variable is
used on the presence of measures for ethnic minority groups.
Turning to cultural variables, the region of a country as well as an attitudinal
variable are used. In both cases the aim is to capture liberal attitudes in general,
not necessarily attitudes towards ethnic minority groups specifically. The region
of each country was coded following Norris (2004). The regions recognised are:
Western Europe, the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia as one region;
Nordic countries; Eastern European countries; countries of Asia and the
Pacific; the Middle East and Northern Africa; Sub-Saharan countries; and
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Whilst regional variables are fre-
quently used as a measure of cultural attitudes (see for example Paxton 1997,
Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Contreras 2002, Paxton and Kunovich 2003,
Nanivadekar 2006, Tripp and Kang 2007), unfortunately this approach is not
perfect. Regional variables incorporate historical cultural differences, but to a
small degree they also encompass electoral and economic factors. Despite this,
however, regional differences are a suitable variable. Not only can all countries
be classified in a relatively unambiguous nature, but also are regional differences
highly associated with other cultural factors such as the predominant religion or
attitudinal variables.
In order to capture attitudes towards marginalised groups in society in a more
direct way, a scale was constructed using data from the World Values Study
Group (2006), including questions on what kind of neighbour the respondents
would not tolerate (‘On this list are various groups of people. Could you
please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?’). One of the
questions available specifically asks about people of a different race, but these
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estimates appear unreliable: substantively higher values are obtained when
people are asked about a specific ethnic group rather than others in general.
For this reason, a ten-item scale is used, using a range of potential neighbours
as the basis: people with a criminal record, people of a different race, heavy drin-
kers, emotionally unstable people, Muslims, immigrants or foreign workers,
people with AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, Jews. By no means is this
meant to imply that different ethnic minorities actually were criminals or other-
wise deviant, but that there may be a tendency to treat them in a similar manner.
As aforementioned, of interest are liberal attitudes more generally. The scale in
principle ranges from 0 to 10, depending on how many kinds of people were men-
tioned as unacceptable neighbours (Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.93). The scale has been
inverted so that a higher score on this scale means that a respondent is more tol-
erant towards marginalised groups in society. The national means are used,
ranging from just under two to approximately six, meaning that there is signifi-
cant variance between countries.
The make-up of society, finally, is enumerated using the measure of cultural
heterogeneity as outlined by Fearon (2003). This measure attempts to capture the
ethnic diversity of a country by considering the ethnic groups and their proportion
in the population. Fearon also includes considerations of the linguistic similarity
between ethnic groups to cater for cultural differences. Even though Fearon’s
data are a significant step forward in estimating the significance of social clea-
vages, the data cannot completely disentangle salient cleavages from other clea-
vages (Laitin and Posner 2000, Posner 2004). Using measures that disregard
cultural distance, the reported effects are weakened but not substantively differ-
ent, suggesting that in this case the exact enumeration is not an issue. Further on
the make-up of society, information about the geographical distribution of ethnic
minorities is based on whether clustering was mentioned in the country profiles in
Britannica (2006). The variable distinguishes between no clustering, a tendency
of clustering, and heavy clustering.
Data
The ethnic representation scores are based on newly collected data on the ethnic
distribution of representatives. These data are based on official publications by
the parliaments, biographies provided by the parliaments, and information pro-
vided by parliamentary contacts as listed on the Inter-Parliamentary Union
(IPU) webpage (IPU 2006). These sources indicate the ethnicity of individual
members of parliament, or quantify the proportion of members of parliament
in a certain ethnic group. The data collected were complemented by data col-
lected by Alonso and Ruiz (2007), Reynolds (2006), as well information included
in country reports published by the US Department of State (2006). Alonso and
Ruiz (2007) collected data for 16 countries in Eastern Europe; Reynolds (2006)
covered a range of countries across the world, whereas the US Department of
State reports cover most countries of the world. As with the data newly collected
for 2006, the number of parliamentary seats is the basis for these data. The data
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used are based on individual members of parliament and do not attempt to infer
ethnicity from party membership. Rather than single estimates, Alonso and Ruiz
(2007) and Reynolds (2006) use averages for multiple elections where applicable.
As a result of the multiple data sources, there are two or even three data points for
many of the countries, and in no case can apparent discrepancies between sources
be determined. It is possible that ethnic groups might be more easily ascertained
in some cases, but the fact that the different data sources agree to a high degree
seems to indicate that in practice classification is not an area of concern. Whilst
the data may not be perfect, they seem robust: The substantial results of the stat-
istical calculations are not affected by substituting data sources.
The data for the population are taken from national censuses, and where
unavailable from Britannica (2006), and Fearon (2003). In a few cases data
had to be used on the population rather than exclusively citizens of the country
for reasons of availability. No case could be determined where this difference
appears significant enough to distort the reported findings.
Findings
In order to maximise the number of cases, initially regional differences are used
as a measure of cultural differences, in line with many other studies. Following
theoretical reasoning, cultural attitudes are addressed in a more direct manner
in the latter half, using a scale based on attitudinal questions. Unfortunately by
so doing the sample size is reduced significantly because of data availability,
but the robustness of the findings is addressed. First, however, it will be necessary
to look at the levels of ethnic group representation.
Levels of ethnic group representation vary significantly between countries.
They range from 0.72 in Moldova to near perfect representation in Iceland,
Poland, the Philippines, or San Marino (range 0.28). The mean representation
score is 0.95, with a standard deviation of 0.06. There are many countries with
relatively high levels of ethnic representation. Excluding countries where the
population is ethnically relatively homogenous leads to a similar distribution,
with a concentration of values towards the upper end of the scale. The observed
skew does not seem to be problematic, judging by residual analyses. The rep-
resentation scores for all countries can be found in the appendix.
In 75 per cent of the national parliaments, at least one member of an ethnic
minority group is present. In the more heterogeneous countries, this value is
closer to 95 per cent. This indicates that in most countries, members from
ethnic minority groups are in one way or another present in parliament, particu-
larly in countries where they form a more substantial part of the population.
In a first step, the modelling is designed to maximise the number of cases.
This means that regional variables are used as a proxy of attitudinal differences
between countries. Table 1 outlines the results of three multivariate models.
In model 1, the electoral formula and other electoral factors are included, the
second model controls for the heterogeneity of society, whereas model 3
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introduces regional variables to account for cultural attitudes. Model 1, to begin
with, performs badly. With only electoral variables, the model fit is poor, and
none of the variables appears to be a significant co-variant. On average, statutory
provisions for ethnic groups seem to make no difference, but although insignif-
icant, it might be that more established democracies come with higher levels
of ethnic representation.
The second model introduces a control for the ethnic make-up of the society.
Whilst this increases the model fit substantially, the other variables are not sub-
stantively affected. The premise that the age of democracy may be a significant
factor, however, now looks implausible. One possible interpretation of this is that
ethnic heterogeneity somehow acts as an impediment to establishing democracy
(Lijphart 2004).
Adding considerations of the geographical clustering to model 2 – or any
subsequent model – does not increase the model fit significantly. The variable
itself is not statistically significant (p . 0.1). This finding contradicts a strong
theoretical case, where clustering and representation are expected to go hand
in hand. No significant interaction between the electoral formula and clustering
can be found, and the model fit is not significantly increased by the inclusion
of such an interaction term.
The final model in Table 1 introduces regional differences as a cultural factor.
The difference between Eastern Europe and other countries is shown. Compared
to Eastern European countries, most other regions are characterised by signifi-
cantly higher levels of representation (p , 0.05). Perhaps the cases with the
most significant levels of under-representation in other regions have not yet
Table 1: Multivariate Models of Ethnic Representation Using Regional Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE p-value B SE p-value B SE p-value
Constant 0.94 0.02 0.000 0.98 0.02 0.000 0.96 0.02 0.000
Electoral Formula
Mj/MMM (Base) . . . . . . . . .
PR/MMP 20.01 0.01 0.340 20.01 0.02 0.682 20.01 0.01 0.947
Quotas
No Quotas (Base) . . . . . . . . .
Statutory Quotas 0.00 0.02 0.950 0.00 0.02 0.983 0.01 0.02 0.540
Political Rights 0.00 0.01 0.976 0.01 0.01 0.257 20.00 0.01 0.705
Old Democracy 0.02 0.01 0.188 20.00 0.02 0.935 20.05 0.02 0.005
Heterogeneity 20.18 0.04 0.000 20.21 0.04 0.000
Eastern Europe (Base) . . .
Western Europe 0.08 0.03 0.008
Nordic Countries 0.11 0.04 0.003
Asia and Pacific 0.09 0.03 0.002
Middle East 0.06 0.04 0.095
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.08 0.02 0.001
Latin America 0.08 0.03 0.010
R2 0.03 0.25 0.42
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made the transition to democratic rule, and are thus absent from consideration in
this article. In order to test the robustness of the reported findings, the Human
Development Index (UNDP 2005) may be used as an indicator of cultural differ-
ences. In this case the model fit is lower than in model 3 (R2 ¼ 0.29), but the vari-
able is a significant correlate. Similarly, religious differences – operationalised as
the predominant religion in a country (Inglehart and Norris 2003, Norris 2004) –
may be used, but seem insignificant on their own.
The results outlined in Table 1 suggest that there is an association between
differences in cultural attitudes and levels of ethnic group representation.
Oddly enough, once considering regional differences, the age of democracy is
a significant factor; although the direction of the sign is unexpected. The result
suggests that levels of ethnic representation tend to be higher in newer democra-
cies. Perhaps this is an indication that the age of democracy is in this instance an
inappropriate measure of how well a political system is established. It appears
that some other effect is picked up, since when using the Human Development
Index as an alternative measure of cultural attitudes, the age of democracy is
not a significant factor (p . 0.1). Indeed, in new democracies effects of inter-
national tutelage and diffusion from neighbouring countries may influence the
level of ethnic group representation (Bennett 1991, Stone 2001).
In order to test the robustness of the findings further, in an additional model –
not shown in Table 1 – only the age of democracy, cultural heterogeneity, and
regional differences were considered. This parsimonious model performs rela-
tively well (R2 ¼ 0.40), suggesting that cultural factors are indeed a key variable
influencing levels of ethnic group representation. The fact that different measures
of cultural attitudes perform slightly differently suggest that it may be worth pur-
suing cultural attitudes further. This is done in the remaining analyses.
Now in a second step, the nature of cultural attitudes is investigated in more
detail. Assuming that attitudes towards marginalised groups in society are caused
by multiple factors, it can be expected that a model incorporating a more immedi-
ate attitudinal variable should lead to a better model fit than models using
regional variables. In order to do this, however, it is unfortunately necessary to
reduce the number of cases considered. This is the case because the correspond-
ing questions are not asked in all the countries covered by the World Value
Survey, as well as the limited coverage of said survey: only 33 countries can
be considered when including WVS data.
Table 2 presents the results for model 3 with the reduced sample. The key
findings are unchanged, suggesting that the reduced sample does not differ sig-
nificantly from the larger one. The electoral formula and other electoral factors
appear of little significance, including quotas for ethnic minority groups which
seem to have little impact on average. The age of democracy is no longer a sig-
nificant factor in the reduced sample, whilst both the control for heterogeneity
and the regional variables remain significant covariates (p , 0.1). The estimated
magnitude of the cultural variables, however, is slightly reduced with the smaller
sample. Purely for presentational reasons model 3 in Table 2 shows the difference
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between Eastern European countries on the one hand and all other regions clus-
tered together on the other.
Model 3 is identical to the one used in Table 1, but only includes the 33
countries also used in model 4. For presentational reasons the difference
between Eastern European countries and all other countries is shown.
As outlined in Table 2, the replacement of the variable on regional differences
with the more direct attitudinal counterpart leads to a better model fit. Once again,
in this model the age of democracy is not a significant factor. This finding adds
weight to the suggestion that the result reported initially is somewhat spurious:
The age of democracy may pick up some cultural differences which are not
covered in the attitudinal variable. The negative sign of the coefficient means
that suggestions of international tutelage and diffusion in new democracies
remain a plausible explanation.
The other variables, however, are not substantively affected: electoral factors
such as the electoral formula still appear to be of little influence. The magnitude
of the control for ethnic heterogeneity is similar in models 3 and 4. Whereas the
coefficient for regional differences included in model 3 in Table 2 refers to a
binary variable, the corresponding coefficient in model 4 stands for the average
number of neighbours mentioned as unacceptable. The magnitude of the standar-
dised estimates is similar. Adding further electoral variables to model 4 does not
increase the model fit significantly, and such variables are statistically insignifi-
cant (p . 0.1).
Discussion
Using a cross-national approach, this article broke with previous studies where
single countries are the focus, introducing a comparative perspective. By so
doing, the influence of electoral and cultural factors on the level of ethnic
group representation could be illuminated.
Table 2: Multivariate Models of Ethnic Representation in a Reduced Sample
Model 3 (Reduced Sample) Model 4
B SE p-value B SE p-value
Constant 0.95 0.04 0.000 0.95 0.05 0.000
Electoral Formula, Mj/MMM (Base) . . . . . .
PR/MMP 20.00 0.02 0.877 20.03 0.02 0.270
Quotas, None (Base) . . . . . .
Statutory Quotas 0.01 0.03 0.779 0.01 0.03 0.813
Political Rights 20.01 0.02 0.327 20.02 0.01 0.156
Old Democracy 20.04 0.03 0.199 20.04 0.03 0.137
Heterogeneity 20.26 0.07 0.001 20.23 0.07 0.002
Region, Not Eastern European 0.05 0.05 0.099
Attitudes, Marginalised Groups 0.03 0.01 0.032
R2 0.46 0.56
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The results of the empirical analyses suggest that ethnic group representation
is perhaps not just another example of descriptive representation, but that the key
covariates differ to some extent from what is commonly reported for the rep-
resentation of women in parliament (Rule 1987, Paxton 1997, Kenworthy and
Malami 1999, Norris 2004, Leyenaar 2004). In this sense, the study of the rep-
resentation of ethnic groups in parliaments merits more attention than currently
found. Contrary to the expectation, none of the electoral factors seemed to be sig-
nificantly associated with the level of ethnic representation. This was the case not
only for the electoral formula and its related measures of proportionality, but
perhaps disturbingly also for the provision of quotas.
In contrast, cultural factors proved more successful in predicting the level of
ethnic group representation. In particular, significant regional differences could
be identified, suggesting that different historical experience may be a significant
factor for ethnic representation. However, cultural attitudes seem to be influenced
by a multitude of factors, and the more directly measured variable of attitudes
towards marginalised groups in society fared better still. It was this aspect of cul-
tural attitudes that appears to dominate the picture: in places where the general
population is more open towards marginalised groups, ethnic minorities are
more likely to be included in national parliaments.
Unfortunately the lack of appropriate data means that this article can say little
about the role of ethnic minority candidates in shaping levels of representation.
For example, it is conceivable that in some places members from ethnic min-
orities do not come forward in sufficient numbers, and are in part for this
reason under-represented. However, to a large extent, the attitudinal variable
should cater for these instances.
Given that ethnic minorities make up a different proportion in different
countries, controlling for the ethnic heterogeneity proved a necessary step.
However, as outlined above it is the case that in some places where ethnic min-
orities form a considerable proportion of the population, they are included
accordingly. What follows is that ethnic divisions are probably not equally
salient in different places, with varying consequences for ethnic group represen-
tation, depending on the size of the minority population.
Coming back to the hypotheses, this article fails to provide evidence for the
suggestion that the electoral formula and other electoral factors are significant
factors (H1). This is true for all the factors tested, irrespective of the control
for ethnic heterogeneity. The suggestion that the nature of the electoral system
has little impact on the level of ethnic representation contradicts expectations out-
lined by many previous studies (Welch 1990, Saggar 2000, Birnir 2004, Spirova
2004, Reynolds 2006, Bochsler 2006). However, the lack of association in the
cross-national analysis may indicate that other factors dominate the picture for
ethnic group representation. It might be that the e´lite are to some extent able to
adjust to the particular electoral setting.
Similarly, the suggestion that more established democracies are associated
with higher levels of ethnic representation could not be supported (H2). At first
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sight this seems to contradict suggestions that the levels of establishment and
institutionalisation of the political system are significant for the representation
of minority groups (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). However, the finding that
levels of ethnic representation in many new democracies are on a par with
more established democracies may indicate that minority representation is
approached more successfully from the beginning. This might point towards
more inclusive attitudes, but Yashar (2003) suggests that the particular circum-
stances in which a democracy is established matter in more general terms.
In terms of statutory provisions for ethnic minority groups, this article casts
serious doubt on their effectiveness (H3). Whilst statutory quotas and reserved
seats seem to make little difference on average, it would be inappropriate to
suggest that this was necessarily the case in individual instances. Firstly, it
appears that countries with statutory provisions for ethnic minority groups are
able to avert the worst cases of under-representation. Secondly, it is the case
that quotas often do not honour the proportion of ethnic minorities in the popu-
lation, or are only applied to some minority groups in society. As a consequence,
the effects of quotas are reduced – even when enforced, such as in the case of
reserved seats. Looking at the aggregate level of representation, the result is
that quotas and related provisions appear ineffective. This means that a diligent
implementation of such measures is crucial for achieving increased levels of
ethnic group representation.
Turning to the effects of cultural factors, finally, this article appears to indi-
cate that such factors dominate in the case of ethnic group representation (H4). In
line with all the literature on political culture, the causality of this factor merits
some discussion (Fuchs 2007). The argument is that a small part of these cultural
attitudes is shaped by the level of representation in national parliaments, with
members of parliament acting as role models. However, there are a great
number of other influences on the predominant attitudes in the population, includ-
ing historical differences, religion, the level of development, and role models
from visible public positions other than parliament (Duverger 1955, Goffman
1976, Sharpe 1976, Sunstein 1996, Chynoweth 2006, Fuchs 2007). In any
case, the strength of the cultural factors probably indicates that a focus entirely
on electoral aspects is misplaced when trying to explain differences in the
levels of ethnic group representation.
Given that changes in the prevalent values may be slow, it seems natural that
electoral changes are considered by those concerned with improving the level of
representation of ethnic minority groups. However, it appears that the exact
implementation of such factors is crucial. For example, enforced measures to
increase the number of parliamentarians from ethnic minorities are relatively
rare, indicating that the awareness of under-representation may often be low or
that the political inclusion of minorities may not be considered a pressing
issue. What is more, measures to increase the level of representation are invari-
ably restricted to the political realm, meaning that the integration of ethnic min-
ority groups in other aspects of life is not necessarily linked. It thus seems that a
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strong leadership is required to ensure that measures are implemented in such a
way that they are effective for all ethnic groups. As an alternative option, it can be
attempted to influence the attitudes of the general public. On the one hand, such a
step may be necessary to implement enforced quotas successfully – assuming
that the political e´lite are not too detached from the voters. On the other hand,
once attitudes have changed to this extent, the implementation of measures to
ensure representation may no longer be so pressing.
Conclusion
For the first time the levels of ethnic group representation were studied with a
multivariate cross-national perspective. Considering both electoral and cultural
variables, the results in this article cast doubt on whether the role of the electoral
formula and other electoral factors in shaping political representation is domi-
nant, as often implied in single-country studies. As such, the findings suggest
that ethnic group representation is perhaps not just another example of descriptive
representation, and that the study of ethnic group representation deserves more
attention.
Once controlling for the ethnic make-up of society and cultural attitudes,
electoral aspects seem of little significance. Perhaps worryingly for proponents
of electoral engineering, this on average includes quotas and related measures.
However, this article has suggested that strong leadership ensuring diligent
implementation of statutory interventions may be a temporary measure to
improve the representation of minority groups. Cultural attitudes – particularly
when measured as positive attitudes towards marginalised groups in society in
general – appear to be the key driver of ethnic representation in national parlia-
ments. This means that electoral provisions to include ethnic minorities in parlia-
ment may only be successful to reduce tensions if complemented by changes in
attitudes in the wider population.
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Table A1: Ethnic Representation Score (ERS) and Ethnic Groups Identified, as of August 2006
Country ERS Groups Identified
Albania 0.980 Albanian, Greek
Antigua and Barbuda 0.955 Black, non-Black
Argentina 0.970 White, non-White
Armenia 0.990 Armenian, other
Australia 0.968 White, Oceania, Asian, African
Bahamas 0.974 Black, other
Bangladesh 0.995 Bengali, other
Barbados 0.950 Black, non-Black
Belgium 0.979 White, Turkish, Arab, Indian
Benin 0.896 Fon and related, Yoruba and related, Bariba and related,
Somba and related
Bolivia 0.975 Quechua and Aymara, mixed or White
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.997 White, Roma
Botswana 0.916 Tswana, other
Brazil 0.967 Black, other
Bulgaria 0.914 Bulgarian, Turks, Roma
Burkina Faso 0.975 Mossi, other tribes
Canada 0.859 White, Indian, Aboriginal, Black, Arab, Chinese
Cape Verde 0.995 African and Creole, European
Central African Republic 0.961 Majority tribes, Muslim, M’boro
Chile 0.975 White and white Amerindians, Amerindians and visible
minorities
Colombia 0.968 Mixed, Black, Indian
Costa Rica 0.970 White and Mestizo, other
Croatia 0.936 Croatian, Serb, Roma
Cyprus 0.958 Greek-Cypriot, other
Czech Republic 0.971 White, non-White
Denmark 0.997 Danish, Faroe, Greenland
Dominica 0.995 Black and mixed, Amerindians and other
Ecuador 0.770 Mestizo and Spanish, Amerindian and Black
El Salvador 0.995 Mestizo and White, Amerindian
Estonia 0.795 Estonian, Russian
Fiji 0.960 Fijian, Indo-Fijian
Finland 0.997 White, non-White
France 0.951 White, Arab, Polynesian, Turkish
Georgia 0.903 Georgian, Abkhazian, Adzhar, Ossetian, Russian
Germany 0.978 Whites, Northern African and Middle Eastern
Greece 0.997 Greek, Muslim
Guatemala 0.844 Mestizo and European, indigenous people
Guyana 0.927 East Indian, African, Amerindian, Mixed, Portuguese,
Chinese
Honduras 0.967 Mestizo and White, Amerindian and Black
Hungary 0.943 Hungarian, Roma
Iceland 0.999 White, non-White
Ireland 0.995 White, non-White
Israel 0.864 Jewish, Arab
Italy 0.982 White, non-White
Japan 0.993 Japanese, half-Japanese and naturalised
Kiribati 0.994 Micronesian, other
Kyrgyzstan 0.905 Kyrgyz, other
Latvia 0.829 Latvian, Russian, Judaic, Karelian, Polish




Country ERS Groups Identified
Liechtenstein 0.989 White, non-White
Lithuania 0.867 Lithuanian, Polish, Russian
Luxembourg 0.989 White, other
Macedonia 0.885 Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Roma
Madagascar 0.987 Malayo-Indonesian, Cotiers, French, Indian, Creole
Malawi 0.991 Bantu, Asian
Mali 0.973 Majority peoples, Tuareg and Moor
Moldova 0.723 Moldavian, Gagauz, Slav
Monaco 0.989 White, Arab and Jewish
Mongolia 0.980 Mongol, Kazakh
Namibia 0.978 Black, White
Nauru 0.920 Nauruan, Chinese and European
Netherlands 0.895 Netherland, foreign born
New Zealand 0.856 European, Maori, Pacific, Indian
Norway 0.986 White, Asian and non-White
Palau 0.912 Palauan, Filipino and other
Panama 0.998 Mestizo and White, Amerindian
Papua New Guinea 0.976 Melanesian, non-Melanesian
Peru 0.939 Majority population, indigenous people
Philippines 1.000 Majority population, Moro
Poland 0.999 Polish, other
Portugal 0.975 Portuguese, other
Romania 0.985 Romanian, Hungarian, Roma
Samoa 0.983 Samoan, European and mixed
San Marino 1.000 White (no ethnic minorities present)
Serbia and Montenegro 0.813 Yugoslav, Albanian, Hungarian, Sndzak Muslim, Roma,
Croat
Slovakia 0.910 Slovak, Hungarian, Roma
Slovenia 0.917 Slovenian, Hungarian, Italian
Solomon Islands 0.993 Melanesian, non-Melanesian
South Africa 0.793 Black African, White, Coloured, Indian
Sri Lanka 0.952 Sinhalese, other
Suriname 0.943 Majority population (Hindustani, Creole, Javanese),
Maroons
and other minorities
Sweden 0.976 Swedish, ethnic minority
Switzerland 0.961 White, non-White
Tanzania 0.992 Bantu, other
Thailand 0.906 Thai, other
Tonga 0.994 Polynesian, European
Trinidad and Tobago 0.849 South Asian, African, Chinese
Tuvalu 0.980 Polynesian, Micronesian
Ukraine 0.943 Ukrainian, Russian, Crimean Tartar, Crimean Russian
United Kingdom 0.948 White, ethnic minority
United States 0.828 White, African, Asian, Hispanic, Native American
Uruguay 0.985 White and Mestizo, Black
Vanuatu 0.988 Ni-Vanuatu, other
Venezuela 0.954 White and Mestizo, Black and other
Zambia 0.988 African, White, Asian
Note: In the case of Denmark, an almost identical representation score is achieved when considering
Danish and migrant groups (ERS ¼ 0.970). In the case of Japan, an almost identical representation
score is achieved when considering Japanese, Korean, and Chinese (ERS ¼ 0.994).
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